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This paper discusses theoretical issues concerning 
Vygotsky’s work that have remained unaddressed in 
the dominant interpretations of his work, either in the 
former Soviet psychology or in the dominant Western 
interpretations. This paper builds on interpretations f 
Vygotsky’s concepts oriented by the unity of 
emotional and cognitive processes and focused on the 
search for new psychical unities on which to build a 
systemic representation of the human mind. Because 
Vygotsky did not provide a definite  position on such 
questions, I have centered on the analysis of the 
consequences of his legacy for the development of a 
definition of subjectivity from a cultural-historical 
standpoint.  
 




Vygotsky’s theory has spread into Western 
psychology, particularly through American 
translations and interpretations of his works. In 
North American scholarship, however, two blind 
spots exist regarding Vygotsky’s legacy: the link 
between Vygotsky and Soviet psychology and the 
recognition of the first and last moments of 
Vygotsky’s work. Those gaps in the American 
interpretation have caused Vygotsky’s ideas 
concerning the representation of the psyche as a 
system and the unity of affective and cognitive 
processes to be overlooked – both were 
emphasized by the author, especially in the first 
and last moments of his work (González Rey, 
2008).   
Regarding the separation of Vygotsky from the 
development of Soviet psychology at that time 
(González Rey, 2001, 2002), I consider that (1) 
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the different theoretical backgrounds of 
Vygotsky’s translators in Western psychology 
and (2) their resulting difficulty in understanding 
the systemic character of Vygotsky’s work could 
account for this problem. That misunderstanding 
concerning the systemic character of Vygotsky´s 
work explicitly expressed in the non-
consideration of some of Vygotsky’s more 
integrative concepts, like personality, the social 
situation of development, and sense. However, 
history always implies different interpretations, 
which are largely dependent on the interpreters’ 
own positions as well as the context from which 
such interpretations are produced.  
With regard to the second blind spot, 
Vygotsky’s emphasis on emotions and his effort 
to develop a new psychical unity able to integrate 
cognitive and affective processes have been 
ignored. Their absence from Western Vygotskian 
interpretations is odd, but more peculiar is their 
absence from Soviet psychology itself, where the 
relevance that he placed on emotions and the 
complex emotional system as the driving forces 
of human development were ignored until the 
1990s (Davydov, 1996; Leontiev, 1992, 2001). 
The consequences of ignoring those concepts for 
contemporary psychology remain, in my view, 
underestimated. 
In this paper, I intend to focus on the first and 
last moments of Vygotsky’s work and, in 
particular, on his ideas concerning the relevance 
of emotions and the unity of emotional and 
cognitive processes as generative psychical 
forces, which in Vygotsky’s opinion were as real 
as any other phenomenon defined by its concrete 
character. With regard to his last moment, I center 
on the concept of sense and social situation of 
development in order to present a different 
alternative in the interpretation of his legacy: a 
cultural-historical theory of subjectivity. I am 
aware of the difficulties of this task given the 
prejudice against this concept, which has been 
labeled by many authors from different theoretical 
positions as a leftover of the modern 
philosophical tradition based on the idea of the 
rationalistic subject.  
However, concepts cannot be viewed as frozen 
entities. Their meanings are not fixed in any 
significant way. The relevance taken by the topics 
of the language, the culture and the symbolical 
productions in the first half of XX century created 
new conditions for the development of the topic 
of subjectivity on new basis.  
The evolution of Vygotsky’s 
thought  
Within Soviet psychology, Vygotsky was 
oriented, practically from the very beginning of 
his work, toward developing a new approach to 
psychology on the basis of Marxism, a 
philosophical position that was to become a 
fundamental source for Russian scientists after the 
October Revolution. Even though for Vygotsky 
only an objective psychology could follow 
Marxist principles, he attributed great significance 
to the subjective side of psychical phenomena, 
particularly in the first and last moments of his 
work. The tension between subjective and 
objective comprehensions of the human mind is 
apparent throughout Vygotsky’s work. 
Vygotsky’s different moments, rather than 
temporally ordered stages, could be considered as 
different blending of ideas from his written works 
in different times. Notwithstanding his important 
reflections related to emotions, personality, 
fantasy and the generative capacity of the mind in 
some of his first works, in the same period it was 
also possible to find ideas addressed in a 
completely different direction.     
In “Psychology of Art” and in his first 
publications related to defectology, Vygotsky 
seemed to be centered on a more systemic 
comprehension of human mental functioning. 
Nevertheless, from those very first works, it is 
possible to identify the tension between the 
objective and subjective emphases in his 
comprehension of the psyche. When I refer to the 
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subjective aspect of the psyche in his work, I am 
considering his emphasis on the generative 
character of the emotions because Vygotsky, at 
that moment, did not have a clear consciousness 
of the ontological specificity of subjective 
processes.  A very characteristic expression of 
that emphasis on the subjective side of psychical 
phenomena in the first period of his work 
appeared in “Psychology of Art”: 
 
 This way, all our fantastic and non real 
“perezhivaniya”, in essence occur on an emotional 
basis completely real. So, we see that feeling and 
fantasy do not represent two separate processes, but 
essentially one and the same process. We correctly 
observe fantasy as a central expression of an 
emotional reaction (Vygotsky, 1965, p. 272). 
 
This approach to the human mind, which 
underlines its generative function as closely 
linked to emotional processes, is particularly 
distinctive of the book in which it appears. Those 
emotionally real occurrences defined a new kind 
of reality, an emotional one, different from other 
“realities” based on different attributes of 
intelligibility as knowledge productions. The idea 
that fantasy is a central expression of the 
emotional reaction in fact led to the recognition of 
those processes as part of the human reality, a part 
that up to now has almost always been replaced 
by cognitive functions and actions in sociocultural 
psychology (Werstch, 1998; Bronckart, 2008; 
Rogoff, 1998, 2002). The ontological issue raised 
by the specific nature of the human psyche was 
not openly discussed in Soviet psychology until 
the middle of the seventies. Vygotsky also 
avoided that discussion. Elaborating at length on 
the role of emotions, Vygotsky stated in the same 
book: 
 
 Pathological cases of phobia, obsessive fears, etc., 
directly link to certain representations that almost 
invariably are absolutely false and distort reality, 
thus finding their spiritual expressions. So, a sick 
person who suffered obsessive fear is, in essence, 
sick by the sentiment. They suffer a fear without 
any objective cause, which is enough to suggest to 
them, in their fantasy, that everyone is persecuting 
them (Vygotsky, 1965, p. 271). 
 
Once again, the author defined emotions as 
responsible for human states “without any 
objective cause”. In doing so, he recognized the 
generative character of emotions for human 
behavior. Vygotsky’s orientation toward art 
indicated from the very beginning of his work not 
only his interest in art but his attraction to the 
complex affective processes involved in human 
artistic expression. Based on artistic creation, 
Vygotsky proposed a new project for the 
development of psychology as a whole, centered 
on a representation of the psyche focused on the 
relevance of emotions and their related processes, 
particularly fantasy and imagination, which were 
central in “Psychology of Art”. Vygotsky’s strong 
inclination to consider the subjective side of the 
psyche was also evident in his first works on 
defectology, which were also written before 1927. 
In “Defect and Compensation”, one of his more 
relevant works written in 1924 and published 
after he made some corrections in 1925, he 
pointed out:  
 
 “Psychologists who worked with blind people at 
that time thought that the development of the blind 
centers on their blindness. The psychology of 
blindness is essentially the psychology of victory 
over blindness” (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 57). 
 
The psychology of blindness, for him, did not 
result from the objective state of blindness; on the 
contrary, it represented a way to overcome the 
restraints of the blindness. What is implicit in 
Vygotsky’s statement concerning blindness is that 
real shared and universal objective conditions do 
not become psychological drives for their 
objective consequences, they become 
psychological drives as result of the psychological 
alternatives created by blind people in dealing 
with those consequences. These psychical 
alternatives should be identified as subjective 
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because they resulted from the functioning of the 
mind as a whole. The difference between 
subjectivity and other forms of objectivity is an 
ontological difference. 
Although Vygotsky was centered on the socio-
cultural genesis of the psyche throughout his 
work, it was never clear in the course of his work 
how those complex human psychological 
expressions organize themselves on a social basis. 
It was in “Psychology of Art” where he more 
audaciously approached the social genesis of the 
human psyche: 
 
 Therefore, the non-Marxist social psychology 
understands social phenomena as crudely 
empirical...as collective, as relations with other 
persons. Society this way is understood as an 
aggregate of persons, as a complementary 
condition of the person’s activity. These 
psychologists do not admit that in a more intimate 
setting, in the personal movement of ideas, of 
feelings, etc., the individual psyche is completely 
social and socially conditioned (Vygotsky, 1965,  
p. 20). 
 
The social genesis of the human mind was 
clear from Vygotsky’s initial work, but in his 
works between 1928 and 1931 social was 
replaced by external immediate relations and 
operations which becoming internal through 
internalization. His attempt to make explicit the 
social-cultural character of the psyche took on 
another meaning in that second moment of his 
work. In that moment, instead of centering on the 
social character of the psyche, Vygotsky focused 
on its objective character based on the concept of 
internalization. The notion of internalization was 
associated with an instrumental- operational 
representation of the relations between humans 
and the world. Activity theory, typically defined 
as the continuation of Vygotsky’s legacy, can be 
associated with this part of his work. Under the 
activity theory, domain-based object activity 
became the central concept of psychology. Many 
Soviet psychologists and philosophers have 
criticized this view of activity theory (Lomov, 
1979; Mikjailov, 2006; Radzikhovskii, 1988;  
Orlov, 1990; and others).   
Early in his career, Vygotsky used categories 
like personality and motivation in his search for 
complex psychical unities that could be used as 
the driving force of human behavior. Those 
categories also addressed a systemic 
comprehension of the psyche. However, this 
effort was overlooked by the dominant Western 
interpretations of his works. As Chaiklin pointed 
out concerning personality within the cultural–
historical research: “How can a concept be so 
important yet receive relatively little attention i 
current research?” (Chaiklin, 2001, p. 238).   
An interest in the topic of personality was 
recurrent throughout Vygotsky’s work; in the first 
moment of his work, it was addressed in his 
definition of the individual psyche as a system. 
Vygotsky never made empirical inquiries oriented 
toward personality. This concept took different 
meanings throughout his work due to the various 
principles that dominated its different moments.  
The intention to take personality as an 
integrative concept, as a new synthesis of other 
psychological facts instead of an aggregate of 
elements, was clear in Vygotsky’s next statement: 
 
 Only vigorous departure from the methodological 
boundaries of traditional child psychology could 
lead us to study the development of the 
psychological higher synthesis that, with all 
fundament, could be defined as the child 
personality (Vygotsky, 1995, p. 45). 
 
Personality represented his interest in mental 
functioning as a whole. Through this concept in 
the first period, Vygotsky signaled a new 
ontological definition of the psyche oriented 
toward a new psychical synthesis irreducible to 
functions. There has been a strong tendency to 
reify the second moment of Vygotsky’s work, 
emphasizing semiotic mediation, signs, tools and 
internalization as the mature accomplishments of 
his work, ignoring the involvement of those 
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processes and tools in the functioning of the 
psychical system as a whole.   
Some of the strongest Russian semioticians 
and philosophers who were contemporaries of 
Vygotsky, such as Bakhtin and Shpet, never 
separated signs from the complex subjective 
characteristics of the individual, nor from the 
social contexts within which action takes place. 
As Shpet stated: “...a unique material sign, word, 
embodies and condenses the unit of cultural sense 
and subjective contents” (Shpet, 1996, p. 245). 
However, Vygotsky’s emphasis in that second 
moment of his work on semiotic mediation as an 
essential characteristic of the higher psychological 
functions departed from psychical system 
functioning. Thereby, topics like emotions, 
fantasy, personality and imagination in fact 
disappeared from his analysis of the functions. 
That moment can be chronologically situated 
between 1928 and 1931.   
Regarding personality in that second moment, 
he stated: 
 
 It should be said, therefore, that we turned into 
ourselves through others; this rule does not only 
refer to personality as a whole, but to the history of 
each isolating function. In that fact takes root the
essence of the cultural problem of development 
taken in a purely logical form. Personality is in 
itself what it is, based on what it means for others 
(Vygotsky, 1995, p. 149). 
 
Personality is formed on the basis of what it 
means for others. Starting from this assumption, 
Vygotsky understood the genesis of personality 
mechanically as a result of the external influences 
of others’ opinions. This theory of the genesis of 
personality disregards the collateral effects of 
social experiences on personality, turning its 
genesis into a process defined from the outside. 
Personality appeared as an effect of external 
causes.  
That second moment of his career can be 
thought of as an “objectivistic turning point” 
(González Rey, 2007, 2008). Psychical functions 
were understood as an internalization of prior 
external processes and operations. Vygotsky was 
nearer than ever to Piaget in that period: 
 
 The sign, in the beginning, is always a way of 
social relationship, a way of influence over others, 
and only after fulfilling this function it becomes a 
way of influencing myself…. The reflection, said 
Piaget, could be taken as an internal debate. It 
should be mentioned, besides this, that the 
language is in the beginning a way of 
communication with others, and only later as an 
internal language it becomes a way of thinking 
(Vygotsky, 1995, p. 146-147).     
     
At that time,1 he remarked on the importance 
of operations in psychological development and 
understood the unity between external operations 
and psychical phenomena through the concept of 
internalization. Like Marx, who attributed a 
decisive role to tools in labor activities, Vygotsky 
gave a central role to tools in his understanding of 
mediation in human psychical activities. Practical 
tools used in concrete activities have the same 
functions as signs, which represent the tools of 
the psychological functions. The most important 
tool in Vygotsky’s analysis was speech. Through 
the tool concept, Vygotsky established a direct 
succession between inter-mental and intra-mental 
operations. On this basis, he introduced his 
concept of higher mental functions. From this 
period comes one of his best-known statements: 
 
 Any higher mental function was external and 
social before it was internal.... We can formulate 
the general genetic law of cultural development in 
the following way: Any function in the child’s 
                                                          
1  It is not my intention to establish a periodization of 
Vygotsky’s work, but it is necessary to advance in the
interpretation of Vygotsky’s thought without approaching 
it as a monolithic corpus. That monolithic representation 
of Vygotsky’s work has been based on Vygotsky’s 
followers as enemies who have essentially centered on the 
second period of his work. In each moment of Vygotsky’s 
work, a mix of ideas with different theoretical meanings 
emerged (González Rey, 2008).  
Outlines • No. 1   • 2009      Historical relevance of Vygotsky’s work •  Fernando Luis Gonzalez Rey 64 
cultural development appears twice or on two 
planes.... It appears first between people as an 
intermental category, and then within the child as 
an intramental category (Vygotsky, 1995, p. 197-
198). 
 
Vygotsky explained the transition from inter-
mental to intra-mental, a specifically psychical 
field, through internalization, which still 
represents a very objectivistic approach to the 
comprehension of the psyche. This 
comprehension of that process does not lend a 
generative character to the mind as a system, 
recognizing it only as an internal expression of a 
formerly inter-mental process.  Several Soviet 
psychologists also criticized the concept of 
internalization in different periods (Rubinstein, 
1964; Ananiev, 1977; Orlov, 1990; Brushlinsky, 
1977; Abuljanova, 1973). 
  One of the main principles assumed by Soviet 
psychology was the comprehension of the mental 
processes as a reflection of the real word, which 
was in fashion in Soviet Marxist philosophy at 
that time and was rigidly assumed as an attribute 
of any “Marxist” construction related to human 
psychological phenomena. It was utterly 
impregnated in the imaginations of psychologists, 
and this prevalence turned into one of the more 
important barriers for the development of the 
topic of subjectivity in psychology.   
The relevance of reflection was central in the 
works of all of the founders of Soviet psychology. 
A.N. Leontiev wrote: 
 
 Introducing the concept of reflection into 
psychology as a basic concept laid the foundation 
for its development on a new Marxist-Leninist 
theoretical basis. Psychology has developed for 50 
years since that time, and its concrete-scientific 
presentations have developed and changed; the 
main thing – the approach toward the psyche as a 
subjective image of objective reality – has 
remained and is unchangeable (Leontiev, 1978,            
p. 27). 
 
The central place given to the principle of 
reflection led Leontiev to identify the psyche as 
an image. The image, taken as a reproduction of a 
given external object, could be considered as 
subjective only for its belonging to the subject, 
but, ontologically, it represents nothing new in 
relation to the object. Going forward on this 
question, Leontiev continued: 
 
 The Lenin theory of reflection considers sensory 
images in human consciousness as prints, 
photographs of an independently existing reality 
(Leontiev, 1978, p. 33). 
 
Therefore, the full identity between the image 
and the object is affirmed since it is considered to 
be like a print.  
Afterwards, in an attempt to overcome that 
mechanistic view of the psyche and of the 
reflection itself, on which the theory of activity 
developed,  Leontiev stated: 
 
 But this [the prior reference related to the Lenin 
theory of reflection] forms only one side of the 
characterization of psychic reflection; the other 
side consists of the fact that psychic reflection, as 
distinct from mirror and other forms of passive 
reflection, is subjective, and this means that it is 
not passive, not dead, but active, that into its 
definition enters human life and practice, and thatit 
is characterized by the movement of a constant 
flow, objective into subjective (Leontiev, 1978,         
p. 33). 
 
That paradoxical style, in which an underlining 
statement is contradicted some pages later, was 
characteristic of Soviet authors investigating 
certain “hot” topics of a doctrinal character, as 
was the case of reflection in psychology. Leontiev 
flew in “a circle” over the same question. In doing 
so, he tried to reconcile the active character of 
reflection with the representation of its objective 
genesis, but he mistakenly reduced his 
comprehension of its objective genesis to a 
reproduction of an external given reality in a 
psychical result, taking the image as the most 
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plausible psychological phenomenon for 
illustrating that process. On this basis was 
developed the activity theory; a given external 
phenomenon, in this case an object, became the 
basis for the objective character of the psyche 
through its reproduction as an internal psychical 
process as a result of internalization. From that 
assumption, activity theory essentially led to 
inquiry into cognitive and sensorial processes on 
a positivistic experimental methodological basis.      
That attempt to develop an objective 
psychology also impacted Rubinstein, who can be 
considered as the Soviet psychologist who dealt 
in the greatest depth with the theoretical 
challenges resulting from the relation between 
philosophy and psychology. On reflection, he 
wrote:  
 
 The Marxist theory of reflection is an application 
of the Dialectical materialist principle of reflection 
on the knowledge process, a principle that 
established, as was seen above, that external 
conditions act through internal ones. Every process 
is determined by external objective conditions and 
is refracted through the internal laws of the very 
process (Rubinstein, 1965, p. 59-60). 
 
 Rubinstein made a notorious effort to save the 
active character of reflection, long before 
Leontiev’s attempt. The discussion continued in 
similar terms for more than thirty years; the 
original Rubinstein text quoted above dated from 
the 1940s. It provides evidence of the difficulties 
faced by Soviet psychologists in dealing with that 
topic. Despite Rubinstein’s effort in the defense 
of the active character of reflection on the basis of 
the current internal psychical structure as a 
mediator from external influences, he could not 
overcome the one-sided representation of 
reflection as a process that takes place from 
external to internal. It is curious that Rubinstein 
grouped reflection with knowledge processes, not 
with psychical functions. That terminological 
difference could reflect Rubinstein’s attempt to 
understand the genesis of other psychical 
processes based on new principles. The idea of 
reflection as it was understood by Soviet 
psychologists, giving priority to objective, 
external given objects, reduced psychical 
processes to an internal, intrapsychical 
phenomenon. This position was very paradoxical 
considering Soviet psychologists’ explicit 
intention to move forward with a cultural-
historical definition of the psyche. Soviet 
psychology only explicitly revisited the topic of 
subjectivity and its generative character in the 
1970s, when activity theory became a target of 
many critics.2 
The fragility of that representation centered on 
the comprehension of reflection as the transition 
from external facts and operations to internal 
operations and processes; this transition 
contributed to maintaining the concept of 
“external influences”, which could be considered 
as a remnant of a mechanistic determinism. Such 
a term indicated a contextual representation of 
reality that develops through concrete and 
fragmenting influences. This scheme unavoidably 
implied the preservation of a mechanical subject-
object dichotomy within which the object is 
considered as primary and the subject as 
secondary, an effect of the object’s influences. 
Such an approach was mechanical as opposed to 
dialectic. The social and historical realities within 
which persons grow up and interact should be 
understood as a network of ongoing facts and 
consequences unfolding into the subjective 
production of many people. Subjectivity is not an 
effect; it is a complex human production within 
which collateral effects, consequences, facts, and 
subjective configurations of the individuals and 
those social spaces within which they live 
combine into a recursive and complex subjective 
network.     
                                                          
2 For more information about this point, consult “The Thesis 
and Speech of V Congress of the Society of Psychologists 
of the Soviet Union,” Moscow, 1977, the central topic of 
discussion of which was “The problem of activity in
soviet psychology”. 
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  The absence of a clear ontological position 
related to the human psyche in Soviet psychology 
led Vygotsky to identify the psyche with 
something different, in this case, with an inter-
mental or external operation. In doing so, nothing 
qualitatively new was added to the external 
operation after becoming internal. The psyche, 
from this viewpoint, does not differ from action, 
whether operational or communicative: it is the 
system of internalized actions. 
Vygotsky characterized himself as being in a 
permanent stream of thought. His last period was 
particularly rich and contradictory, but, 
unfortunately, he had no time to deeply develop 
his ideas from that period. He returned in that 
time to many of the topics developed during his 
first period. One new concept that he addressed 
was sense, which ephemerally appeared in some 
of his last works, bringing to light different 
alternatives for the development of questions that 
remained unanswered after his first writings.  
The category of sense and its 
importance in Vygotsky’s work 
 
In “Imagination and its development in 
childhood”, one of the works of his last period 
written in 1932, Vygotsky began to represent 
imagination not as a function but as a system, 
taking an important step in the representation of 
the human psyche as a complex system. In this  
text  Vygotsky wrote: 
 
 Thus, interconnected in this single knot, we find 
three of the greater problems of contemporary 
psychology, and of contemporary child psychology 
in particular: The problem of thinking, the problem 
of imagination and the problem of will (Vygotsky, 
1987b, p. 349). 
 
Will is closely interconnected with affective 
processes. In that lecture, Vygotsky took an 
important step in considering the close inter-
relations between the three mentioned processes. 
However, he could go no further in the idea 
regarding the definition of a new qualitative unity 
of the psyche.     
The concept of sense was promising because 
of its malleability, and the movement turned it 
into an interesting theoretical means for 
understanding the changeable and complex 
psychical production in such a way that it would 
be possible to make sense of subjective processes. 
Traditionally, psychological categories were 
based on concrete and invariable behavioral 
content considered inherent to certain individual 
psychical patterns. From this representation, it 
would be impossible to follow the process by 
which subjective individual configurations 
develop in humans. However, sense, as it was 
presented prior to Vygotsky by Bakhtin and 
Shpet, was oriented toward processes in relation 
and in movement. Sense had heuristic potential to 
become a new psychological synthesis between 
external and internal processes. 
The above assumption was justified by 
Vygotsky’s following remark: 
 
 A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the 
psychological facts that arise in our consciousness 
as a result of the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid 
and complex formation which has several zones 
that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of 
these zones of the sense that the word acquires in 
the context of speech (Vygotsky, 1987a, p. 275-
276). 
 
Vygotsky maintained the definition of sense 
associated with the word, as did Paulhan. 
Vygotsky´s representation of sense as the 
"aggregate of all the psychological facts that arise 
in our consciousness as a result of the word" 
permitted him to integrate this category into a 
new psychical whole irreducible to a word. In 
doing so, for the first time he defined a category 
capable of integrating different psychological 
functions and processes in each person’s concrete 
expression. Sense seemed to represent a 
psychological production involved in the flux of 
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language, not in a deterministic way, but as a 
psychical chain of events able to find new 
psychological values through the ongoing process 
of action. On the same page as the above 
quotation, he stated: 
 
 The word is an inexhaustible source of new 
problems. Its sense is never complete. Ultimately, 
the sense of the word depends on one's 
understanding of the word as a whole and on the 
internal structure of personality (Vygotsky, 1987a, 
p. 276). 
 
By including personality in the definition of 
sense, Vygotsky renders it more psychological 
than Paulhan’s definition. The consequences of 
that inclusion were very important because they 
allowed him to begin to understand sense as a 
psychological unity. Understanding sense as 
being influenced by personality, in fact, allowed 
him to integrate the ‘word’ into the domain of 
personality and personality into the domain of 
action. However, Vygotsky could go no further in 
a complete reformulation of his psychological 
categories on the basis of this concept, nor even 
make explicit its possible consequences for the 
reformulation of psychology. Sense remained 
unfinished and incomplete in his work, and I am 
not sure if Vygotsky himself clearly understood 
the potential of that concept for the development 
of psychology.  
A new and decisive moment in Vygotsky’s 
understanding of the affective-cognitive unity was 
expressed in his paper "On the question of the 
psychology of the creative artist", written in 1932. 
In that paper, also belonging to this final period of 
his work, he claimed:  
 
 In the process of societal life, feelings develop and 
prior systems of relations disintegrate (within 
which they exist as a result of the biological 
organization of psyche); the emotions come into 
new relationships with other elements of psychical 
life, a new system appears, new blendings of 
psychical functions; units of higher order emerge, 
governed by special laws, mutual dependencies, 
and special forms of connection and motion 
(Vygotsky, 1984, p. 328). 
 
It is not a coincidence that in this quotation  he 
did not mention sense. In this quotation, the 
author supported the idea of the integration of 
different elements of psychical life around new 
relationships defined by emotions, but this time 
without any reference to words or to the world. 
This was an important moment because it 
represented again Vygotsky’s recognition of the 
generative capacity of emotions, which he 
emphasized in his first period. His permanent 
reference to the topics of affection and cognition 
and his historical preoccupation with the systemic 
unity of the psyche, supported on the idea that the 
unity between cognitive and affective processes 
was central, left open an alternative for advancing 
into a new representation of the psyche as a 
complex system. 
A.A.Leontiev attempting to define a new 
moment in Vygotsky’s representation of psyche 
on the basis of sense said: 
 
 In connection with Vygotsky, we have become 
accustomed to speaking of a synthesis or unity of 
intellect and affect. But might it not be more 
correct to say-again in his terminology- that he was 
concerned with the relationship between intellect 
(thinking) and sense Vygotsky’s principal thesis 
(summarizing the various formulations found in his 
different works) would then be this: There exists a 
complicated dynamic system of senses that 
includes a motivational (affective) side, as well as 
the will, the dynamic of action, and the dynamic of 
thinking. They can assume various relationships to 
one another and form diverse "networks". Intellect, 
like all higher psychical functions, is subordinated 
to this system. This, then, is the dynamic, self-
developing human psyche in its true wholeness and 
social determinedness. If Vygotsky had lived only 
a few more years, he would surely have 
concentrated his effort on the analysis of this 
system (Leontiev, 1992, p. 43). 
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I agree wholeheartedly with A. A. Leontiev. 
The study of the consequences of the concept of 
sense could be essential for a new ontological 
definition of the human psyche. I would like to 
emphasize from the quotation Leontiev’s idea that 
“intellect, like all higher psychical functions, is
subordinated to this system”. That complex 
dynamic system of senses appears as an 
inseparable moment of any living experience, 
turns into the alive, subjective side of that 
experience. This crucial, central idea only was 
mentioned in the Vygotsky’s work referred above 
(1984); it does not appear in any other of his 
posterior works. Even when  Leontiev in the prior 
commented quotation stated that “he (in reference 
to Vygotsky) was concerned with the relationship 
between intellect (thinking) and affect” , he 
reduced the concept of sense to affection. In doing 
so, the author overlooked the idea of sense as 
unity of psyche, as it appeared in Vygotsky’s 
references to sense. Contrary to Leontiev’s 
statement, I consider that one of the consequences 
of sense could be the consideration of psychical 
functions as functions of sense, which could 
overcome the restriction involved in the definition 
of thinking strictly as a cognitive process. Once 
fantasy and imagination are inseparable of 
thinking we have something more complex than 
mere cognition.    
However, those ideas that characterize the last 
period of Vygotsky’s work were ignored by 
Kharkov’s group, headed by A. N. Leontiev and 
integrated by Vygotsky’s fellows, Luria, 
Zaporozhets, Bozhovich, Elkonin and Galperin, 
among others. A. A. Leontiev wrote: 
 
 There are many theoretical ideas in these works, 
however, that were not picked up by the Kharkov 
group or were only partially accepted. These were 
hardly noticed by Vygotsky’s historiographers and 
were deliberately ignored by his critics. The more 
important of these ideas was that of “sense” or 
“sense field…. Only many years later did            
A. N. Leontiev speak publicly of “personal sense” 
(most clearly in his 1974 work, “Psychological 
problem of the Consciousness of Learning”). There 
appears to be a gap between Leontiev’s “personal 
sense” and Vygotsky’s “sense field”, but it is in 
fact not the case” (Leontiev, 1992, p. 41).     
     
The concept of sense has remained mistreated 
up to now, in particular in the analysis of its 
consequences for the development of new trends 
in psychological thinking. In spite of Vygotsky 
explicitly never develop some consequences of 
the concept of sense, it is impossible to read in his 
short use of this concept, that sense since it “is the 
aggregate of all the psychological facts that arise 
in our consciousness as a result of the word” as 
Vygotsky stated in a mentioned above quotation, 
it is possible to conclude that among that 
aggregate are also emotions. So sense represent a 
cognitive –affective unity configured on human 
action, because words as a permanent part of 
human expressions.  
  
Relevance of the “social 
situation of development” and 
“perezhivanie” in understan-
ding subjectivity from a cultu-
ral-historical optic 
 
After the Vygotsky’s writings about  sense, he,  
in one of his last conferences, entitled by Van 
deer Veer & Valsiner (1994) as “The problem of 
the environment”, introduced the concept of  
‘perezhivanie’ (emotional experience) whose aim 
seems to be very near of that enunciated by 
Vygotsky when he referred to the dynamic 
systems of senses. On regarding ‘perezhivanie’ 
Vygotsky wrote in that conference: 
 
 The emotional experience [perezhivanie]  arising 
from any situation or from any aspect of 
environment, determines what kind of influence 
this situation or this environment will have on the 
child. Therefore , it is not any of the factors in 
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themselves (if taken without reference to the child ) 
which determines how they will influence the 
future course of his development, but the same 
factors refracted through the prism of the 
‘perezhivanie’( Vygotsky, 1994,  p. 339-340).  
  
Vygotsky did not use the concept of sense in 
his analysis on the influence that environment 
will have on the child, using instead 
‘perezhivanie’ to explain a dynamic that could be 
explained through the concept of sense. Given 
Leontiev’s assumption and my particular 
interpretation regarding that category, Vygotsky 
would likely have used sense for explaining how 
environment influences child development. In the 
mentioned conference Vygotsky attempted to 
transcend the mechanical relationship between 
external and internal, in an effort that newly 
reinforced the idea of mind as production and not 
as internalization.  
The term ‘refraction’, used by him instead of 
the term reflection, has important implications for 
thinking of psyche not as an effect; this idea is 
crucial for the development of the topic of 
subjectivity from this approach. The term 
production, as I use it here, does not mean any 
transcendental or innate production, but a 
subjective one; its means the emergence of 
emotional states that are not understandable only 
from the objective circumstances that influences 
the person from the outside. The ‘refraction’ 
implies a recognition that the effect of any 
external event to the person’s situation or process 
would depend on the individual’s psychical 
organization and action in the ongoing process of 
a living experience.    
The distance taken by Vygotsky from the 
objective determination of psyche was also 
explicitly defended by him in the next paragraph: 
 
 At the same time environment should not be 
regarded as a condition of development which 
purely objectively determines the development of a 
child by virtue of the fact that it contains certain 
qualities or features, but one should always 
approach environment from the point of view of 
the relationship which exist between the child and 
its environment at a given stage of his development 
(Vygotsky, 1994, p. 338)  
 
Social environment is not considered by him as 
a given, but as something organized in the course 
of human relationships. Social facts are not 
objective given ‘entities’ which influence 
development as objective influences; they will 
take on different emotional values for 
development as result of the person’s actual 
psychical organization. Social facts become 
relevant for development by their transformations 
into emotional states, a process that takes place by 
their refraction through the person’s psychical 
organization.  
The ideas developed by Vygotsky in that 
conference, which is central to understanding the 
path of his thinking in that last moment of his life, 
were very similar to those discussed by him in 
several other lectures addressed to the students of 
medicine in the Moscow University in 1934.3 In 
those conferences, according to Bozhovich 
(1981), Vygotsky sustained that the environment 
should not be studied as a given “social situation 
of development” which is determined by its own 
objective definition of the child’s development. 
Taking another position in relation to the social 
character of human development, Vygotsky 
introduced the important concept of “social 
situation of development” that, according to 
Bozhovich (1981), was defined as the specific 
combination of the child’s personal characteristic 
and those external condition under which the 
child’ experience takes place.  
                                                          
3 That reference was taken from Bozhovich (1981), one f 
his disciples who latter integrated to the Kharkov’s group  
from which she left due to her differences with                  
A. N. Leontiev in relation to the definition of motive. 
According to her, those conferences dictated by himin 
1934 were not published until 1968, year in which 
appeared the Russian original of the Bozhovich’s work 
from which I took this information.    
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Vygotsky discussed the “social situation of 
development” through his definition of 
‘perezhivanie’ as the psychological unity that 
appears as result of the relationship between 
situational and the personal characteristics of each 
person at each stage of development. In 
“Psychology of the Environment” he wrote:  
 
 “So, in a emotional experience [perezhivanie] we 
are always dealing with an indivisible unity of 
personal characteristics and situational 
characteristics, that are represented in 
‘perezhivanie’  ” (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 342). 
 
Every external event becomes psychological 
only as a result of that emotional experience 
[perechivanie] that in turn resulted from its 
relevance to the current psychical child’s 
structure. So ‘perezhivanie’ is singular and 
unpredictable; it is a truly psychical production. 
Emphasizing the singular character of  
‘perezhivanie’, Vygotsky stated: 
 
 It is therefore obvious, that if we have two people 
with two different types of constitutional 
characteristics, then one and the same event is 
likely to elicit a different emotional experience 
[perezhivanie] in each of them. Consequently, the 
constitutional characteristic of the person and 
generally the personal characteristics of children 
are, as it were, mobilized by a given emotional 
experience [perezhivanie], are laid down, become 
crystallized within a given emotional experience  
[perezhivanie] but, at the same time, this 
experience does not just represent the aggregate of 
the child’s personal characteristics which 
determines how the child experienced this 
particular event emotionally, but different events 
also elicit different emotional experiences 
[perezhivanie] in the child (Vygotsky, 1994,             
p. 342-343). 
 
Vygotsky made an effort to understand 
‘perezhivanie’ not as “encapsulated” in itself 
content that becomes the “cause” of the behavior, 
but as the production which takes place through 
the ongoing course of development.  As Vygotsky 
said above “different events elicit different 
‘perezhivanie’ in the child”.  
 At this time in the evolution of his work, from 
the very dynamic and complex representation of 
psyche emerged a new definition of human mind 
as a subjective system configured through 
emotional states [perezhivanie]. However, similar 
to the relationship with the category of sense, 
Vygotsky could not consequently developed the 
concept of emotional moment ‘perezhivanie’. At 
the end in “Psychology of Environment” he 
wrote:  
 
 I think that you will agree with me when I say 
that any event or situation in a child’s 
environment will have a different effect on him 
depending on how far the child understand this 
sense and meaning (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 343). 
 
   As Bozhovich wrote:   
 
 If the concept of ‘perezhivanie’ developed by him 
(is referred to Vygotsky) approached  us to the 
interpretation to the real causes of child 
development, the later search for the link that 
defines development that concludes in the concept 
of generalization , led us back to intellectualist 
positions (Bozhovich, 1991, p. 125).    
  
Following the trajectory of Vygotsky’s thought 
it is possible to appreciate his efforts toward a 
comprehension of human psyche as a system in 
which emotions are as important as intellectual 
meanings and representations. Just through 
concepts like ‘perezhivanie’ and sense, Vygotsky 
attempted to define psychical unities able to 
reveal the indissoluble relationship between 
cognitive and affective processes. These concepts 
revealed his worries about the dominant 
deterministic position that prevailed at that time 
in Soviet psychology regarding the genesis of 
psyche based on reflection. The Vygotsky´s 
enunciation of concepts like refraction, the 
generative and active character of emotions and 
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the singular character resulting from the impact of 
circumstances on psychical development, opened 
a new challenge for the comprehension of human 
psyche; human psyche appeared as a complex 
system impossible to be reduced to the 
assimilation of the facts and processes involved in 
its development. The premises for a new 
definition of subjectivity from a cultural – 
historical standpoint were established. Now it is 
necessary to take those premises advancing on the 
new challenges they opened for the next 
generations.  
Final remarks 
Vygotsky’s work should be understood as a 
system with several moments that contradicted 
one another at certain concrete moments, and it 
cannot be taken as a set of concrete principles 
from beginning to end. His concrete categories 
should be located within the system as a whole, 
avoiding the use of them separately, which could 
lead to the vulgarization of his theory.   
• The first and last moments of Vygotsky’s 
work have been misunderstood in their 
consequences for the development of psychology. 
The concepts of sense, ‘perezhivanie’ and “ social 
situation of development”  introduced by him in 
the last period of his career were coherent with his 
multiple attempts to define unities of psychical 
life, which is strong evidence of the importance 
that he placed on the comprehension of the 
psyche-like system.  
• The concepts of sense and ‘perezhivanie’ 
represented an important turning point in 
Vygotsky’s work. Based on those concepts, 
Vygotsky implicitly recognized the generative 
character of the human mind. This recognition is 
important to develop the concept of subjectivity 
based on new principles, overcoming the 
representation of the human psyche as a reflection 
that was long dominant in Soviet psychology.  
• Sense and ‘perezhivanie’ appear not as 
“entities”, but as unities organized on the ongoing 
subject’s experience; both concepts underline the 
relevance of emotions in the understanding of 
human mind. This relevance given to emotions 
implies a recognition of human states as truly 
subjective productions. They do no result from 
mere the assimilation of external influences. 
• Vygotsky work opened a path to advance on 
the topic of subjectivity as a continuous 
production of symbolic – emotional 
configurations, which would result from the 
complex alternatives generated in the interwoven 
movement between dominant at the beginning of 
any system of action or relationships subjective 
configurations, and those new configurations 
appearing on the ongoing process of 
development. The concepts and processes of this 
complex order should be elaborated.  
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